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Abstract
Both in game theory and in general equilibrium theory, there exists a number of universally con-
verging adjustment processes. In game theory, these processes typically serve the role of selecting
a Nash equilibrium. Examples are, the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten or the equilibrium
selection procedure proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey. In general equilibrium, the processes are
adjustment rules by which an auctioneer can clear all markets. Examples are the processes studied
by Smale, Kamiya, van der Laan and Talman, and Herings. The underlying reasons for conver-
gence have remained rather mysterious in the literature, and convergence of different processes has
seemed unrelated. This paper shows that convergence of all these processes relies on Browder’s
ﬁxed point theorem.
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1. Introduction
Both in game theory and in general equilibrium theory, there exists a number of adjust-
mentprocessesthatareuniversallyconvergent.Auniversallyconvergentadjustmentprocess
in game theory is an adjustment process that converges to a Nash equilibrium for almost
all games. A universally convergent adjustment process in general equilibrium theory is
an adjustment process that converges to a Walrasian equilibrium for almost all economies.
In game theory, these processes typically serve the role of selecting a Nash equilibrium.
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Examples are the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) or the equilibrium se-
lection procedure proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). In general equilibrium, the
processes are adjustment rules by which an auctioneer can clear all markets. Examples are
the processes studied by Smale (1976), van der Laan and Talman (1987), Kamiya (1990)
and Herings (1997).
Thereareseveralreasonstobeinterestedinuniversallyconvergentadjustmentprocesses.
They give players in a game the opportunity to coordinate on a uniquely determined Nash
equilibrium and an auctioneer in an economy to determine a competitive equilibrium price
system. In a more decentralized setting, they give rational agents in an economy the pos-
sibility to coordinate on current and future prices. Such processes can be used as a tool
to compute equilibria, which is also helpful for comparative statics exercises or policy
recommendations, see Judd (1997) and Eaves and Schmedders (1999).
In game theory, multiplicity of Nash equilibria seems to be the rule rather than the
exception.ThisposesseriousproblemsforNashequilibriumtobeusedasasolutionconcept
for games. One way out is to develop a theory that selects a unique equilibrium for any
game form, and to suppose that all players adopt that theory. An attempt to make such a
theory can be found in Harsanyi and Selten (1988). That theory relies heavily on the tracing
procedure as introduced in Harsanyi (1975). The tracing procedure is a strategy adjustment
procedure by which players can adopt initial beliefs about the play of their opponents and
turnthemintouniquelydeterminedbeliefsconsistentwithNashequilibrium.Thesurprising
aspect of the tracing procedure is that convergence to a Nash equilibrium takes place for
almost any game for almost any initial beliefs, so the tracing procedure is universally
convergent.
Quantal response equilibria as introduced in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), are statistical
versions of Nash equilibria, where each player’s payoff is subject to random error. The
concept of equilibrium is consistent in the sense that all players maximize their utility given
the choices made by the others, and the utility maximizing behavior of a player, together
with the error structure, leads to the mixed strategy against which the others optimize.
Quantal response equilibria are quite successful in describing the behavior of participants
in experiments. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) also consider a procedure similar to the
tracing procedure to select a Nash equilibrium. Start with the quantal response equilibrium
where choices are completely determined by the error terms, and follow the path of quantal
response equilibria that results when the error terms vanish. McKelvey and Palfrey show
thatforalmostallgames,auniqueNashequilibriumisselectedinthisway.Again,universal
convergence of the procedure is obtained.
The simplest price adjustment process studied in general equilibrium theory is the Wal-
rasian tatonnement process. It is well-known that it may not converge to a competitive
equilibrium, see Scarf (1960) for some examples. The work of Sonnenschein (1972, 1973),
Mantel (1974) and Debreu (1974), basically claiming that any continuous function sat-
isfying homogeneity of degree 0 and Walras’ law is the excess demand function of an
economy,makesclearthatitispossibletoconstructmanyexampleswhereWalrasiantaton-
nementdoesnotconvergeanddisplayshighlyirregulardynamicbehavior.TheworkofSaari
and Simon (1978) and Saari (1985) implies that simple adaptations of the Walrasian taton-
nement process will not have better convergence properties. Still, at least three universally
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method introduced in Smale (1976), the process of Kamiya (1990), and the process pro-
posed in van der Laan and Talman (1987) for which universal convergence has been shown
in Herings (1997).
The global Newton method of Smale provides a price adjustment rule that does converge
to a competitive equilibrium for almost any economy, so universal convergence is the case.
But it does not converge for any initial price system. Only when the initial price system is
chosen such that the prices of some commodities are sufﬁciently close to zero, convergence
to a competitive equilibrium can be shown. From the work of Keenan (1981), it follows
that there may exist an open set of starting price systems for which Smale’s process does
not converge to some competitive equilibrium price system.
Another universally convergent price adjustment process has been presented in Kamiya
(1990). Under rather weak conditions on the total excess demand function, convergence
to a competitive equilibrium price system is guaranteed for almost every starting price
system. Although the boundary conditions of Kamiya are weak, they are not derived from
assumptions on primitive concepts.
An alternative price adjustment process has been proposed in van der Laan and Talman
(1987). For this process, universal convergence has been shown in Herings (1997). Under
standard conditions on utility functions, consumption sets and initial endowments, this
price adjustment process converges to a Walrasian equilibrium price system for almost all
economies and almost all starting price systems.
Apparently, several processes in distinct areas of research have been shown to be uni-
versally convergent. The reason for these strong convergence properties has remained mys-
terious up to now, and the convergence proofs were rather ad hoc as a consequence. The
aim of the current paper is to point out that convergence of each one of these processes
can be understood from ﬁxed point theory and is not even related to differentiability. This
makes our proofs very different from the original convergence proofs. It also increases our
understanding as to why these distinct adjustment processes converge. This understanding
is useful to develop other universally convergent mechanisms that may incorporate features
that are lacking in current processes.
Some alternatives and extensions have already been suggested. The procedure described
in Yamamoto (1993) may serve as an alternative to the tracing procedure, and Joosten and
Talman(1997)describeanalternativepriceadjustmentprocess.Extensionshavebeenmade
to economies with linear or constant returns to scale production (see van den Elzen, 1993,
1997; van den Elzen et al., 1994), and to economies with short-run price rigidities (see
Herings, 1996; Herings et al., 1997, 1998, 1999). All these extensions can be understood
as well from the unifying treatment that is given in this paper.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we outline the general structure
behind the approach that is used in our proofs and we present the most important tool
required, Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem. In Section 3, we apply this methodology to the
tracingprocedureofHarsanyiandSelten(1988)andinSection4totheequilibriumselection
procedure proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Next we turn to price adjustment
processes. We treat Kamiya’s process in Section 5, the process proposed in van der Laan
and Talman (1987) in Section 6, and Smale’s global Newton method in Section 7. Section 8
discusses and illustrates how the approach suggested can be used to derive new adjustment
processes. Section 9 concludes.344 P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370
2. A unifying approach
Beforeturningtothespeciﬁcadjustmentprocesses,itishelpfultohighlighttheapproach
that can be used to give a unifying treatment of convergence. Usually, dynamic processes




where x(t) ∈ Rm denotes the state vector reached at time t ∈ R+ and g is a function from
some subset of the state space Rm into Rm. The vector x typically corresponds to a mixed
strategy combination in case of a strategy adjustment process, and to a price system for a
price adjustment process. The function g speciﬁes the way in which players adjust their
strategies, or prices adjust in general equilibrium. The initial state x(0) is assumed to be
given.
Conditions for which the system of differential equations has a solution are well-known,
see for instance Hirsch and Smale (1974). The orbit γ(x(0)) is the set of state vectors
that is generated by the system of ﬁrst-order differential equations when the initial state
is x(0),
γ(x(0)) ={ x ∈ Rm|∃t ≥ 0,x = x(t)}.
We denote the closure of γ(x(0)) by ¯ γ(x(0)), and call ¯ γ(x(0)) an orbit as well.
Although all adjustment processes we consider can be formulated as a system of differ-
ential equations, they can alternatively be described by the orbit that they generate. In fact,
all adjustment processes considered share the property that the easiest way to formulate
them is in terms of the orbit that they generate. For each adjustment process, we deﬁne a
system of equations whose solutions correspond to the orbit of the adjustment process. We
study the properties of the set of solutions to the system of equations by means of ﬁxed
point theory and not by the theory of dynamic systems. In this paper we argue that the
convergence of various adjustment processes is best understood from a single ﬁxed point
theorem that is introduced in Browder (1960).
Theorem 2.1 (Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem). Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex
subset of Rm and let ϕ :[ 0 ,1] × S → S be a continuous function. Then the set of ﬁxed
points, Fϕ ={ (λ,s) ∈ [0,1] × S|s = ϕ(λ,s)} contains a connected set, Fc
ϕ, such that
({0}×S)∩ Fc
ϕ  =∅and ({1}×S)∩ Fc
ϕ  =∅ .
Theorem 2.1 implies that for all λ ∈ [0,1], ({λ}×S)∩ Fϕ  =∅ . That property would
also follow from a repeated application of the well-known ﬁxed point theorem of Brouwer
(1912). The surprising part of the theorem is that there exists a connected set Fc
ϕ with those
properties. Notice that along the connected set of ﬁxed points, it is not necessarily the case
that λ increases monotonically from 0 to 1. The value of λ increases initially, may decrease
later on, and will eventually increase until it reaches the value 1.
In all sections, the strategy of proof is the same. A function ϕ satisfying Browder’s
ﬁxed point theorem is constructed such that the ﬁxed points in the connected set Fc
ϕ corre-
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indicates the amount of progress of the adjustment process. At λ = 0, a ﬁxed point corre-
sponds to the initial state vector x(0).A tλ = 1, a ﬁxed point yields an equilibrium state
vector.
Ourassumptionsonprimitivesaresoweak,thatorbitsarenotnecessarilynicelybehaved
sets, that is differentiable paths or loops. In exceptional cases it is for instance possible that
pitchforks may arise, or even higher dimensional solution sets. Such exceptional cases are
usually excluded by making differentiability assumptions and employing a transversality
argument.
Let Φ be the set of twice continuously differentiable functions ϕ :[ 0 ,1] × S → S
endowed with the topology of uniform convergence of the values of the function and its
ﬁrst partial derivatives. Theorem 2 in Mas-Colell (1974) asserts that there is an open and
dense set Φ  ⊂ Φ, such that for every ϕ ∈ Φ  the set Fc
ϕ is a closed segment, that is
a set diffeomorphic to the unit interval [0,1], and only the end points of the segment
intersect {0,1}×S, so one end point intersects {0}×S and the other {1}×S. This result
is not completely surprising as the set Fc
ϕ is deﬁned by a number of equations equal to the
dimensionofS inanumberofunknownsequaltothedimensionofS+1,leavingonedegree
of freedom for the solution set. Mas-Colell’s result does not require {0}×S to be unique.
This, however, is important for algorithmic purposes, as it avoids the problem which point
in {0}×S is connected to {1}×S.
Since an orbit ¯ γ(x(0)) of an adjustment process corresponds in a one-one way to the
ﬁxed points of the mapping ϕ, it follows as a consequence of Theorem 2 in Mas-Colell
(1974) that generically an orbit is a nicely behaved set that does not allow for pitchforks or
higher dimensional solution sets. In particular, an orbit ¯ γ(x(0)) connects x(0) to a unique
equilibrium. It is for this reason that we concentrate, in this paper, on the property that
¯ γ(x(0))connectsx(0)tosomeequilibrium.Thestrongerpropertythat ¯ γ(x(0))isconnected
by a segment to a unique equilibrium follows by suitable differentiability assumptions and
transversality arguments.
In the strategy adjustment processes of Sections 3 and 4, the parameter λ is an explicit
part of the adjustment process and is inversely related to the weight given to the prior and
the level by which players make errors, respectively. The function ϕ :[ 0 ,1] × S → S is
such that (λ,s) ∈¯ γ(x(0)) if and only if (λ,s) ∈ Fc
ϕ.
In the price adjustment processes of Sections 5–7, there is no explicit parameter λ.F o r
λ ∈ [0,1], a subset T(λ) of the state space is deﬁned, which is strictly increasing in λ.
The set T(0) corresponds to the starting price system p0, whereas T(1) contains all price
systems of interest. The number λ(x) ∈ [0,1] is deﬁned to be such that λ(x) = λ if x
belongs to the boundary of T(λ). The number λ(x), therefore, measures the distance of x
to x(0). The function ϕ :[ 0 ,1] × S → S is constructed such that x ∈¯ γ(x(0)) if and only
if (λ(x),x) ∈ Fc
ϕ.
Our construction also suggests alternative functions ϕ that lead to orbits ¯ γ(x(0)) corre-
spondingtonoveladjustmentprocesses,forinstancebyspecifyingalternativesubsetsT(λ).
Section 8 illustrates how such a new adjustment process can be derived. Section 8 also dis-
cusses the reverse question. How to specify a system of differential equations that leads to
¯ γ(x(0)) as an orbit? Section 8 shows that this can be achieved by applying the so-called
Davidenko equations (Davidenko, 1953) to the system of equations characterizing the orbit
¯ γ(x(0)).346 P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370
3. The tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten
The tracing procedure is used repeatedly in the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi
andSelten(1988)toﬁndauniquesolutionoftheso-calledbasicgames.Itisalsousedtode-
ﬁnerisk-dominancerelationshipsbetweenNashequilibria.Itmodelsaprocessofconvergent
expectations that rational players can use to ﬁnd a particular Nash equilibrium as the solu-
tion for a given game. Before applying the tracing procedure, players are assumed to have a
common probability distribution expressing their expectations about the strategy choices of
theotherplayers.Thiscommonprobabilitydistributioniscalledaprior.Inthelineartracing
proceduretheinformationonthebestrepliestothepriorisgraduallyfedbackintotheexpec-
tations of the players. As the linear tracing procedure proceeds, both the prior and the best
responses will gradually change until both converge to some Nash equilibrium of the game.
Consider a non-cooperative N-person normal form game Γ = (Φ1,...,Φ N,R 1,...,
RN). Each player i = 1,...,N, has Mi pure strategies. The k-th pure strategy of player i is
denotedby(i,k).Thesetofpurestrategiesofplayeri isdenotedbyΦi.Thetotalnumberof
strategies is given by M =
 N
i=1 Mi. The set of all pure strategy combinations is given by
Φ =
 N
i=1 Φi. The function Ri : Φ → R denotes the payoff function of a player i and it is
extended in the standard way to the set of all mixed strategy combinations S =
 N
i=1 SMi.




j=1 sij = 1}.
Given a mixed strategy combination s ∈ S and a mixed strategy ¯ si ∈ Si, we denote by
s \¯ si the mixed strategy combination that results from replacing si by ¯ si. The set of Nash
equilibria of Γ is denoted NE(Γ ).
A probability distribution s0 ∈ S, called the prior, is given for the remainder of this
paper. The prior describes the initial beliefs of all players about the strategies played by the
other players. The prior is assumed to be the same for all players, and the determination
of the prior is part of the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988).F o r
every λ ∈ [0,1], the linear tracing procedure generates a Nash equilibrium of the game
Γ λ = (Φ1,...,Φ N,Hλ
1 ,...,Hλ
N), where the payoff function Hλ
i : Φ → R of player i is
deﬁned by
Hλ
i (φ) = λRi(φ) + (1 − λ)Ri(s0 \ φi).
It is straightforward to extend Hλ
i to the set of all mixed strategy combinations S =
 N
i=1 SMi. The game Γ 0 corresponds to a trivial game, where all players believe that
all their opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior beliefs. The game Γ 1
coincides with the game Γ. The linear tracing procedure links a Nash equilibrium of the
game Γ 0 to a Nash equilibrium of Γ 1. Let L denote the set of all Nash equilibria related to
the games Γ λ, λ ∈ [0,1], so
L ={ (λ,s) ∈ [0,1] × S|s ∈ NE(Γ λ)}.
The linear tracing procedure is said to be feasible if there exists a continuous function γ :
[0,1] → L, i.e. a path, such that γ(0) ∈ L∩({0}×S)and γ(1) ∈ L∩({1}×S). The linear
tracing procedure is said to be well-deﬁned if each path γ :[ 0 ,1] → L such that γ(0) ∈
L∩({0}×S)and γ(1) ∈ L∩({1}×S)has the same image. We consider feasibility as the
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to go from feasibility to well-deﬁnedness by invoking certain regularity properties of L, for
a rigorous proof in the context of the tracing procedure, see Herings and Peeters (2001).
SinceLisasetthatcanbedescribedbyaﬁniteunionofsetsdescribedbyaﬁnitenumber
of polynomial inequalities, it is a semi-algebraic set. All the components of L, that is all
maximally connected subsets of L, are also path-connected. Therefore, any two points in
a component of L can be joined by a path, see for instance Schanuel et al. (1991) for a
nice introduction into the properties of semi-algebraic sets. To show that the linear tracing
procedure is feasible, it is sufﬁcient to show that L has a component that intersects both the
sets {0}×S and {1}×S.
The proof of feasibility of the linear tracing procedure presented here is not new. It
coincides with one of the proofs proposed in Herings (2000). It is repeated here for illustra-
tional purposes, as the connection between Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem and the tracing
procedure is the closest of all the adjustment processes that we will consider.
Let the function σi :[ 0 ,1] × S → SMi be deﬁned by
σi(λ,s) = arg max
¯ si∈SMi
λRi(s \¯ si) + (1 − λ)Ri(s0 \¯ si) − ¯ si − si 2
2.
The function σi is well-deﬁned and continuous because it is the argmax of a function that
is strictly concave, because its ﬁrst two terms are linear in ¯ si, while the third is strictly
concave.
We deﬁne the function f :[ 0 ,1] × S → S by
f(λ,s)= (σ1(λ,s),...,σ N(λ,s)).
The ﬁxed points of f are closely related to the strategies in the set L.
Theorem 3.1. For any non-cooperative N-person game Γ, for any prior s0, it holds that
(λ,s) ∈ L if and only if f(λ,s)= s.
Proof. It is obvious that (λ,s) ∈ L implies f(λ,s)= s.
Suppose there is (¯ λ, ¯ s) ∈ [0,1]×S such that f(¯ λ, ¯ s) =¯ s,b u t(¯ λ, ¯ s) / ∈ L. Then, for some
si ∈ SMi, H
¯ λ
i (¯ s \ si) − H
¯ λ
i (¯ s) = h>0. Since H
¯ λ




i (¯ s \ (i,k)),
it holds that, for 0 <ε<1, H
¯ λ
i (¯ s \ εsi + (1 − ε)¯ si) − H
¯ λ
i (¯ s) = εh > 0. Now,  (εsi +
(1 − ε)¯ si) −¯ si 2 = ε2 si −¯ si 2 <εh , for small enough ε, contradicting that ¯ si is the
argument maximizing the expression in the deﬁnition of σi(¯ λ, ¯ s). 
TheargumentgivenintheproofofTheorem3.1isthesameastheoneusedinGeanakoplos
(1996),whereBrouwer’sﬁxedpointtheorem,asopposedtoKakutani’sﬁxedpointtheorem,
is used to show the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a ﬁnite non-cooperative N-person
game.
Theorem 3.2. For any non-cooperative N-person game Γ, for any prior s0, the tracing
procedure is feasible.
Proof. It is immediate that f satisﬁes the conditions of Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem
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({0}×S)∩Fc  =∅and ({1}×S)∩Fc  =∅ .B yTheorem 3.1 it follows that F = L,s oFc
is a subset of L that connects a best response to the prior s0 to a Nash equilibrium s∗. 
Theorem 3.2 demonstrates that feasibility of the tracing procedure is a corollary to
Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem.
4. The quantal response equilibria of McKelvey and Palfrey
Quantal response equilibria as introduced in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), are statistical
versions of Nash equilibria, where each player’s payoff is subject to random error. One
possible interpretation is that players make errors according to some random process when
calculating their expected payoffs. An alternative interpretation is that players calculate
expected payoffs correctly, but have an additive payoff disturbance associated with each
available pure strategy. For a given speciﬁcation of the error structure, a quantal response
equilibrium is a mixed strategy combination that is consistent with optimizing behavior
subject to the error structure.
Consider a non-cooperative N-person normal form game Γ = (Φ1,...,Φ N,R 1,...,
RN). Player i’s payoff when playing pure strategy (i,k) against a mixed strategy combina-
tion s is subject to error and is given by
ˆ Ri(s \ (i,k)) = Ri(s \ (i,k)) + εik.
Player i’s error vector εi = (εi1,...,ε iMi) is distributed according to a joint distribution
with density function φi. Given the vector of payoffs that player i receives when playing
his pure strategies and when errors are absent, ¯ Ri = (Ri(s \ (i,1)),...,R i(s \ (i,Mi)))
for some s ∈ S, the ik-response set Eik( ¯ Ri) is deﬁned as the set of error vectors that make
pure strategy (i,k) the best response, so
Eik( ¯ Ri) ={ εi ∈ RMi| ¯ Rik + εik ≥ ¯ Rij + εij,j = 1,...,M i}.
The probability of choosing pure strategy (i,k) is then given by




A quantal response equilibrium is a mixed strategy combination s∗ ∈ S that is consistent
with the error structure, thus
s∗
ik = σik(Ri(s∗ \ (i,1)),...,R i(s∗ \ (i,Mi))), i = 1,...,N, k= 1,...,M i.
The following speciﬁcation of the error structure is quite common in the theory of indi-
vidualchoicebehavior(seeLuce,1959)andleadstothelogisticquantalresponseequilibria.
For any parameter θ ≥ 0, the logistic quantal response function is deﬁned by
σik( ¯ Ri) =
exp(θ ¯ Rik)
 Mi
j=1 exp(θ ¯ Rij)
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and is obtained when φi corresponds to the extreme value distribution. The parameter θ
is inversely related to the error level. When θ = 0, the choice of all players is completely
determinedbytheerrors,andcorrespondstoplayingallpurestrategieswithequalprobabil-
ity. When θ approaches inﬁnity, the inﬂuence of the errors disappears. This suggests a way
of selecting Nash equilibria analogously to the tracing procedure. Start from the quantal
response equilibrium at θ = 0 and let the inﬂuence of errors go to zero. McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995) show that for generic games, this approach selects a unique Nash equilib-
rium. We show that for all games the quantal response equilibrium at θ = 0 is connected
by a set of quantal response equilibria to at least one Nash equilibrium. As has been argued
in Section 2, the stronger property that a unique Nash equilibrium is selected follows from
differentiability assumptions and transversality arguments.
Given an error level corresponding to θ, the set of quantal response equilibria of Γ is
denoted by QREθ(Γ ). Let Q denote the set of all quantal response equilibria for varying
values of θ ∈ R+,s o




(θ,s) ∈ R+ × S|sik =
exp(θRi(s \ (i,k)))
 Mi
j=1 exp(θRi(s \ (i,j)))
,
i = 1,...,N, k= 1,...,M i
 
.
To investigate whether the quantal response equilibrium at θ = 0 is connected to a Nash
equilibrium, it is useful to make the transformation θ = λ/(1 − λ) and to deﬁne
˜ Q =
 
(λ,s) ∈ [0,1) × S|sik =
exp((λ/(1 − λ))Ri(s \ (i,k)))
 Mi
j=1 exp((λ/(1 − λ))Ri(s \ (i,j)))
,
i = 1,...,N, k= 1,...,M i
 
.
We deﬁne the function f :[ 0 ,1) × S → S by
fik(λ,s) =
exp((λ/(1 − λ))Ri(s \ (i,k)))
 Mi
j=1 exp((λ/(1 − λ))Ri(s \ (i,j)))
,i = 1,...,N, k=1,...,M i.
The ﬁxed points of f are closely related to the strategies in the set ˜ Q.
Theorem 4.1. For any non-cooperative N-person game Γ, it holds that (λ,s) ∈ ˜ Q if and
only if f(λ,s)= s.
Proof. Obvious. 
ThefollowingresultfollowsimmediatelyfromBrowder’sﬁxedpointtheorem,soaproof
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Theorem 4.2. For any non-cooperative N-person game Γ, for any ¯ λ ∈ (0,1), there is a
component ˜ Q
c
of ˜ Q such that ({0}×S)∩ ˜ Q
c
 =∅and ({¯ λ}×S)∩ ˜ Q
c
 =∅ .
The theorem makes clear that the unique quantal response equilibrium at θ = 0i s
connectedbyquantalresponseequilibriatoaquantalresponseequilibriumforanarbitrarily
high value of θ.
The next step is to extend Theorem 4.2 and to consider what happens in the limit. In
particular, we want to show that the quantal response equilibrium at θ = 0 is connected by
quantal response equilibria to a Nash equilibrium. To this end, we deﬁne
¯ Q = ˜ Q ∪ ({1}×NE(Γ ))
and we show the following result.
Theorem 4.3. For any non-cooperative N-person game Γ, there is a component ¯ Q
c of ¯ Q
such that ({0}×S)∩ ¯ Q
c  =∅and ({1}×S)∩ ¯ Q
c  =∅ .
Proof. For n ∈ N, denote the component ˜ Q
c
of ˜ Q such that ({0}×S) ∩ ˜ Q
c
 =∅and
({1 − (1/n)}×S)∩ ˜ Q
c
 =∅by ˜ Qn. Note that, for n ∈ N, ˜ Qn ⊂ ˜ Qn+1. By Mas-Colell
(1985) (Theorem A.5.1.(ii), page 10), the closed limit of the sequence ˜ Qn, denoted ¯ Qc,i s
connected. We show that ¯ Qc ⊂ ¯ Q.
Let (¯ λ, ¯ s)be an element of ¯ Q
c. Then there exists a sequence of points {(λn,sn)}n∈N such
that λn < 1, f(λ n,sn) = sn, and (λn,sn) → (¯ λ, ¯ s).I f¯ λ<1, then the continuity of f
implies (¯ λ, ¯ s) ∈ ˜ Q ⊂ ¯ Q. Suppose ¯ λ = 1, and suppose ¯ s is not a Nash equilibrium. Then
there is a player i, a pair of pure strategies (i,k) and (i,l), and ε>0 such that ¯ sik > 0, but
Ri(¯ s \ (i,k)) + ε<R i(¯ s \ (i,l)). Since sn →¯ s, there is ¯ n such that Ri(sn \ (i,k)) + ε<





exp(λn/(1 − λn)Ri(sn \ (i,k)))
 Mi
j=1 exp(λn/(1 − λn)Ri(sn \ (i,j)))
≤ lim
n→∞
exp(λn/(1 − λn)Ri(sn \ (i,k)))
exp(λn/(1 − λn)Ri(sn \ (i,l)))
= 0.
Therefore,






a contradiction. We have shown that ¯ Q
c ⊂ ¯ Q.
The property that ({0}×S)∩ ¯ Q
c  =∅and ({1}×S)∩ ¯ Q
c  =∅is immediate. 
As was the case for the tracing procedure, Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem provides an
elegant way to show the connectedness of the quantal response equilibrium at θ = 0t oa
Nash equilibrium.P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370 351




= 1.Anadjustmentprocessisdeﬁnedforatotalexcessdemandfunctionz : RL
+\{0}→RL




l )2 = 1. The following assumption is
made throughout this section.
Assumption1. Thefunctionz : RL
+\{0}→RL satisﬁescontinuity,homogeneity,Walras’
law and the following boundary behavior:
For p ∈ RL
+ \{ 0}, for l = 1,...,L, pl = 0 implies zl(p) > 0.
Assumption 1 is a weak version of the assumptions in Kamiya (1990), where also twice
continuous differentiability of z on RL
++ is assumed. Since prices are normalized such that
 L
l=1(pl)2 = 1, Walras’ law implies that we may replace the excess demand function z by
the excess demand function ˆ z : ˙ BL−1













( ˆ pl)2 < 1
 




l=1 ( ˆ pl)2), l = 1,...,L− 1. The function ˆ z is
obtained by omitting the last component of z and making use of the price normalization.
Kamiya’s process is a weighted average of Smale’s global Newton method,
∂ˆ z( ˆ p)(d ˆ p/dt) =− λ( ˆ p)ˆ z( ˆ p), and Walrasian tatonnement,(d ˆ p/dt) =ˆ z( ˆ p). The weights
depend on the norm of the excess demand and the distance between ˆ p and the initial price
system ˆ p0, where ˆ p0 denotes the initial price system with component L left out. When
formulated as a differential equation, Kamiya’s process is given by
 
∂ˆ z( ˆ p)
 ˆ z( ˆ p) 2
−
I




=− λ( ˆ p)ˆ z( ˆ p),
where I is the (L − 1) × (L − 1) identity matrix and λ is an arbitrary scalar function of ˆ p
such that
sign(λ( ˆ p)) = signdet
 
I
 ˆ p −ˆ p0 2
−
∂ˆ z( ˆ p)
 ˆ z( ˆ p) 2
 
.
Although d ˆ p/dt is not directly deﬁned at ˆ p =ˆ p0 or for a competitive equilibrium price
system ˆ p,itcanbeappropriatelydeﬁnedbytakingalimit.TheprocesscorrespondstoWal-
rasian tatonnement at ˆ p0, and it becomes Smale’s global Newton method as it approaches
an equilibrium.
As Kamiya (1990) shows, prices generated by the differential equation belongs to the set
P =
 









( ˆ pl)2 < 1
∃θ ∈ [0,1], forl = 1,...,L− 1,θ ˆ zl( ˆ p)=(1−θ)(ˆ pl−p0
l )
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Itiseasilyveriﬁedthatθ = 0yieldsp = p0 astheuniquesolution,sop0 ∈ P.Byconsider-
ingθ = 1itfollowsthatifp∗ isaWalrasianequilibriumpricesystemwith
 L
l=1(p∗
l )2 = 1,
then (p∗
1,...,p∗
L−1) ∈ P. From the deﬁnition of the set P it follows that the differential
equationadjustspricesinsuchawaythattheexcessdemandatapricesystemisproportional
to the difference between this price system and the initial price system.
Kamiya (1990) shows that under suitable differentiability assumptions, for a generic
economy, the component of P containing p0 is a path that connects p0 to a Walrasian
equilibrium price system. Since we do not make any differentiability assumptions, nor do
we restrict ourselves to generic economies, we want to show that the component of P
containing p0 connects p0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Kamiya’s adjustment
process is said to be convergent if this latter property holds.
First, we give a different characterization of the set P. It follows from the boundary
behavior and the continuity of z that there exists ¯ ε>0, ¯ ε ≤ p0
L, such that zL(p) > 0
whenever pL ≤¯ ε and
 L
l=1(pl)2 = 1. We introduce the set
BL−1
+ (¯ ε) =
 









( ˆ pl)2 ≤ 1 −¯ ε2
 
.
For any non-empty, closed, convex subset X of Rm, the continuous function πX : Rm → X
is the orthogonal projection on X,s oπX(y) = x if x ∈ X and  y − x 2 ≤  y −¯ x 2, for
all ¯ x ∈ X, i.e. πX(y) is the closest point in X to y. We extend the excess demand function
ˆ z to a function ˜ z deﬁned on RL−1 by setting
˜ z( ˆ p) =ˆ z(πBL−1
+ (¯ ε)( ˆ p)), ˆ p ∈ RL−1.
We deﬁne the set ˜ P by omitting the non-negativity constraints on prices in P and replacing
ˆ z( ˆ p) by ˜ z( ˆ p),s o
˜ P ={ˆ p ∈ RL−1|∃θ ∈ [0,1], forl = 1,...,L− 1,θ ˜ zl( ˆ p) = (1 − θ)(ˆ pl − p0
l )}.





l )2 = 1, it holds that P = ˜ P.
Proof. Consider some ˆ p ∈ P. First, it is shown that ˆ p ∈ BL−1









l=1 ( ˆ pl)2)>0. By Walras’s




ˆ plˆ zl( ˆ p).
Since ˆ p ∈ P there is θ ∈ [0,1] such that θˆ zl( ˆ p) = (1 − θ)(ˆ pl − p0
l ), l = 1,...,L− 1.




l=1 ( ˆ pl)2 = p0
L ≥¯ ε, contradicting ourP. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370 353
supposition. If θ = 1, then ˆ z( ˆ p) = 0, which contradicts 0 >
 L−1
l=1 ˆ plˆ zl( ˆ p). It follows that
θ ∈ (0,1). But then, using the deﬁnition of the set P,
L−1  
l=1





ˆ pl( ˆ pl − p0
l )>0,





l=1 ˆ pl, and θ<1. This con-
tradicts 0 >
 L−1
l=1 ˆ plˆ zl( ˆ p). Consequently, ˆ p ∈ BL−1
+ (¯ ε), from which it is obtained that
˜ z( ˆ p) =ˆ z( ˆ p) and ˆ p ∈ ˜ P.
Now consider some ˆ p ∈ ˜ P. Suppose ˆ p/ ∈ BL−1
+ (¯ ε). Denote the projection πBL−1
+ (¯ ε)( ˆ p)
by ˆ π. Then there is l  such that ˆ πl  = 0o r
 L−1
l=1 ˆ πl = 1 −¯ ε. In the former case, it holds
that ˆ pl  ≤ 0 and ˜ zl ( ˆ p) > 0, and for some θ ∈ (0,1),1
0 <θ˜ zl ( ˆ p) = (1 − θ)(ˆ pl  − p0
l )<0,
a contradiction. In the latter case it holds that 0 >
 L−1
l=1 ˆ πl˜ zl( ˆ p) and, for some θ ∈ (0,1),
θ˜ zl( ˆ p) = (1 − θ)(ˆ pl − p0
l ), l = 1,...,L− 1. Because of the contradiction obtained to
ˆ πl  = 0 in the former case, we may assume without loss of generality that ˆ π   0, so
ˆ p is projected onto the strictly positive part of BL−1





ˆ πl˜ zl( ˆ p) = λ
L−1  
l=1





ˆ pl( ˆ pl − p0
l )>0,
a contradiction. Consequently, ˆ p ∈ BL−1
+ (¯ ε), from which it is obtained that ˜ z( ˆ p) =ˆ z( ˆ p)
and ˆ p ∈ P. 
The lemma makes clear that we may either study the set P or the set ˜ P in order to study
the adjustment process.
For λ ≥ 0, we deﬁne the set
T L−1(λ) ={ˆ p ∈ RL−1|  ˆ p −ˆ p0 2 ≤ λ}.
In Fig. 1 the set T L−1(λ) is shown for various values of λ for the case L = 3. The set
T L−1(0) contains only the point p0. The set T L−1(λ) expands when λ increases, and
T L−1(1) contains the set ˙ BL−1
+ .F o r ˆ p ∈ RL−1, we deﬁne λ( ˆ p) as the distance to ˆ p0,
λ( ˆ p) = ˆ p −ˆ p0 2. It is immediate that ˆ p ∈ T L−1(λ) for all λ ≥ λ( ˆ p).
We deﬁne the function f :[ 0 ,1] × T L−1(1) → T L−1(1) by
f(λ,p)= πT L−1(λ)(p +˜ z(p)).
The ﬁxed points of f coincide with the prices in the set P.
Theorem 5.2. For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 1, for any p0 with  L
l=1(p0
l )2 = 1,itholdsthat ˆ p ∈ P ifandonlyifthereisλ ∈ [0,1],suchthatf(λ, ˆ p) =ˆ p.
1 The argument that θ ∈ (0,1) is similar to the one in the ﬁrst part of this proof.354 P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370
Fig. 1. The sets ˙ BL−1
+ , T L−1(0), T L−1(1/3), T L−1(2/3) and T L−1(1), for ˆ p0 = (1/3,1/3) .
Moreover, either ˆ z( ˆ p)  = 0 and λ = λ( ˆ p) or z( ˆ p) = 0 and f(λ, ˆ p) =ˆ p for all
λ ≥ λ( ˆ p).
Proof. Consider a ﬁxed point ˆ p of f(λ,·),s o ˆ p = f(λ, ˆ p) = πT L−1(λ)( ˆ p +˜ z( ˆ p)).W e
show that ˆ p ∈ ˜ P, from which it follows that ˆ p ∈ P by Lemma 5.1.
Since f(0, ˆ p) =ˆ p0, it is obvious that f(0, ˆ p) =ˆ p implies ˆ p =ˆ p0,s o ˆ p ∈ ˜ P.
Consider the case λ>0. The projection of an arbitrary vector x on the set T L−1(λ) is











l )2 ≥ 0.
The necessary and sufﬁcient Kuhn–Tucker conditions for an optimum are given by
yl − xl + 2µ(yl − p0














l )2 ≥ 0,
µ ≥ 0,P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370 355
where y equals the projection πT L−1(λ)(x) and µ denotes the shadow price of the constraint
λ2 −
 L−1
l=1 (yl − p0
l )2 ≥ 0.
It follows that there exists µ ≥ 0 such that
˜ zl( ˆ p) = 2µ( ˆ pl − p0
l ), l = 1,...,L− 1.
Since µ ≥ 0, it follows that ˆ p ∈ ˜ P.
Consider some ˆ p ∈ ˜ P.I fˆ z( ˆ p) = 0, then it is trivially the case that f(λ, ˆ p) =ˆ p for
all λ ≥ λ( ˆ p). Suppose ˆ z( ˆ p)  = 0. If λ( ˆ p) = 0, then ˆ p =ˆ p0 and trivially f(0, ˆ p0) =ˆ p0.
Suppose ˆ z( ˆ p)  = 0andλ( ˆ p) > 0.Weneedtoshowthatf(λ( ˆ p), ˆ p) =ˆ p,whichisequivalent
to the statement that the projection of ˆ p +˜ z( ˆ p) on T L−1(λ( ˆ p)) equals ˆ p.
Since λ( ˆ p) > 0 there exists θ ∈ (0,1) such that θ˜ zl(p) = (1 − θ)(pl − p0
l ), l =
1,...,L− 1. Substitute in the Kuhn–Tucker conditions, yl =ˆ pl, xl =ˆ pl +˜ zl( ˆ p), µ =
θ/(2(1−θ))and observe that all equalities and inequalities in the Kuhn–Tucker conditions
are satisﬁed. 
When p∗ is a competitive equilibrium, then (p∗
1,...,p∗
L−1) is a ﬁxed point of f for
any value of λ exceeding λ(p∗
1,...,p∗
L−1). When ˆ p is a price system generated by the
adjustment process, but does not correspond to a competitive equilibrium, then ˆ p i saﬁ x e d
point of f(λ( ˆ p),·).
At ˆ p0 the value of λ(·) is zero. Along the path of the adjustment process, the value of λ(·)
increases initially, but it may decrease later on. Eventually, it will increase until it reaches
the value 1, and a competitive equilibrium has been found.
Theorem 5.3. The price adjustment process converges for any excess demand function




l )2 = 1.
Proof. It is immediate that f satisﬁes the conditions of Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem
and so there is a component Fc of F ={ (λ, ˆ p) ∈ [0,1] × T L−1(1)|ˆ p = f(λ, ˆ p)}
such that ({0}×T L−1(1)) ∩ Fc  =∅and ({1}×T L−1(1)) ∩ Fc  =∅ . Let the projec-
tion function g :[ 0 ,1] × T L−1(1) → T L−1(1) be deﬁned by g(λ, ˆ p) =ˆ p. By The-
orem5.2 it follows that g(F) = P. Since g is continuous,g(Fc) is a connected subset
of P that connects the starting price system ˆ p0 to some competitive equilibrium price
system ˆ p∗. 
Convergence of the price adjustment process is a corollary to Browder’s ﬁxed point
theorem.
6. The price adjustment process of van der Laan and Talman
van der Laan and Talman (1987) introduce a price adjustment process for an exchange
economy. The prices of the commodities are normalized by
 L
l=1 pl = 1. Given a total
excess demand function z : RL




































Two types of restrictions are made on prices in the set P. The ﬁrst is an innocuous price
normalization,
 L
l=1 pl = 1. The second concerns the requirement that the relative price of
acommodity,i.e.theratioofthepriceofacommodityanditsinitialprice,beminimalwhen
thecommodityisinpositiveexcesssupply,andmaximalwhenthecommodityisinpositive
excess demand. This is closely related to the ideas behind Walrasian tatonnement, where
prices of commodities in positive excess supply are decreased and those of commodities in
positiveexcessdemandareincreased.Itisobviousthatthestartingpricesystemp0 belongs
to P. It can also be veriﬁed that whenever p∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium price system with  L
l=1 p∗
l = 1, then p∗ ∈ P.
In Herings (1997), it is shown that under suitable differentiability assumptions, for a
generic economy, the component of P containing p0 is a path that connects p0 to a Wal-
rasian equilibrium price system. Since in this section we do not make any differentiability
assumptions, nor do we restrict ourselves to generic economies, we want to show that the
component of P containing p0 connects p0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. The
adjustment process is said to be convergent if this latter property holds.
To simplify the exposition, we renormalize the units of measurement of quantities of












pl = 1, forl  = 1,...,L, z l (p) < 0
⇒ pl  = minl=1,...,Lpl, forl  = 1,...,L, z l (p) > 0
⇒ pl  = maxl=1,...,Lpl
 
.
We may also take the value of excess demand v(p), deﬁned by a function v : RL
++ → RL,
where
vl(p) = plzl(p), l = 1,...,L,
instead of the excess demand z(p), to deﬁne the set P. Since v(p) is positive (negative) if
and only if z(p) is positive (negative), it follows that replacing z(p) by v(p) leaves the set
P unchanged.
We assume that z : RL
++ → RL is an excess demand function, so it satisﬁes
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Assumption 2. The function z : RL
++ → RL satisﬁes continuity, homogeneity, Walras’
law and the following boundary behavior:
If (pn)n∈N is a sequence converging to ¯ p ∈ RL
+ \{ 0}, then limn→∞ z(pn) ∞ =+ ∞ .
ContrarytotheboundarybehaviorinAssumption1,Assumption2followsfromstandard
assumptions on primitives, that is from standard assumptions on consumption sets, utility
functions, and initial endowments.
The continuity and the boundary behavior of z imply that we can choose ¯ ε>0 such that
for any ¯ p/ ∈ SL(¯ ε) ={ p ∈ SL|pl ≥¯ ε, l = 1,...,L}, it holds that zl( ¯ p) > 0 for some l
with 0 < ¯ pl ≤¯ ε.
We modify the value function v near the boundary of the unit simplex SL and extend it
to a function ˜ v deﬁned on T L ={ p ∈ RL|
 L
l=1 pl = 1} by setting
˜ v(p) = v(πSL(¯ ε)(p)), p ∈ T L.
We deﬁne the set ˜ P by omitting non-negativity constraints and replacing z(p) by ˜ v(p),s o
˜ P ={ p ∈ T L| forl  = 1,...,L, ˜ vl (p) < 0 ⇒ pl  = minl=1,...,Lpl,
forl  = 1,...,L, ˜ vl (p) > 0 ⇒ pl  = maxl=1,..., Lpl}.
Lemma 6.1. For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 2, it holds that
P = ˜ P.
Proof. Considersome ¯ p ∈ P.Itisimmediatethat ¯ p ∈ SL(¯ ε)and ˜ v( ¯ p) = v( ¯ p).Therefore,
˜ vl(p) > 0 if and only if zl(p) > 0 and ˜ vl(p) < 0 if and only if zl(p) < 0. So, ¯ p ∈ ˜ P.
Consider some ¯ p ∈ ˜ P. Suppose ¯ p/ ∈ SL(¯ ε). There is l  such that πSL(¯ ε)l ( ¯ p) =¯ ε and
zl (πSL(¯ ε)( ¯ p)) > 0. But then ˜ vl ( ¯ p) > 0 and ¯ pl  < maxl=1,...,L ¯ pl, a contradiction to ¯ p ∈ ˜ P.
Consequently, ¯ p ∈ SL(¯ ε). Therefore, ˜ vl(p) > 0 if and only if zl(p) > 0 and ˜ vl(p) < 0i f
and only if zl(p) < 0. So, ¯ p ∈ P. 
For λ ≥ 0, we deﬁne the set
T L(λ) ={ p ∈ T L|pk − pl ≤ λ, k,l = 1,...,L, k = l}.
In Fig. 2 the set T L(λ) is shown for various values of λ. The set T L(0) contains only the
point (1/3,1/3,1/3). The set T L(λ) expands when λ increases. The set T L(1) contains
the set SL.
For p ∈ RL, we deﬁne λ(p) = maxk =lpk − pl. It is immediate that p ∈ T L(λ) for all
λ ≥ λ(p). We deﬁne the function f :[ 0 ,1] × T L(1) → T L(1) by
f(λ,p)= πT L(λ)(p +˜ v(p)).
The ﬁxed points of f coincide with the prices in the set P.
Theorem 6.2. For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 2, it holds that
p ∈ P if and only if there is λ ∈ [0,1] such that f(λ,p)= p. Moreover, either z(p)  = 0
and λ = λ(p), or z(p) = 0 and f(λ,p)= p for all λ ≥ λ(p).358 P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370
Fig. 2. The sets SL, T L(0), T L(1/3), T L(2/3) and T L(1).
Proof. Consider a ﬁxed point ¯ p of f(¯ λ,·),s o ¯ p = f(¯ λ, ¯ p) = πT L(¯ λ)( ¯ p+˜ v( ¯ p)). We show
that ¯ p ∈ ˜ P, from which it follows that ¯ p ∈ P by Lemma 6.1.








(yl − xl)2 s.t.
L  
l=1
yl − 1 = 0,y k − yl − λ ≥ 0,k  = l.
The necessary and sufﬁcient Kuhn–Tucker conditions for an optimum are given by









yl − 1 = 0,
µk,l(yk − yl − λ) = 0,k  = l,
yk − yl − λ ≥ 0,k  = l,
µk,l ≥ 0,k  = l,
where y equals the projection πT L(λ)(x), µ denotes the shadow price of the constraint
 L
l=1 yl−1 = 0,andµk,l,k  = l,denotestheshadowpriceoftheconstraintyk−yl−λ ≥ 0.
Since ¯ p = πT L(¯ λ)( ¯ p +˜ v( ¯ p)), it follows that there exists µ ∈ R and µk,l ≥ 0, k  = l,
such that







































 = 1 + Lµ,
so µ = 0 and







It also holds that
µk,l( ¯ pk −¯ pl − ¯ λ) = 0,k  = l.
Suppose ˜ vl ( ¯ p) < 0 for some l . Then µk,l  > 0 for some k,s o ¯ pl  =¯ pk − ¯ λ. Since for all
l, ¯ pl ≥¯ pk − ¯ λ, it holds that ¯ pl  = minl=1,...,L ¯ pl. Similarly it can be shown that ˜ vl ( ¯ p) > 0
implies ¯ pl  = maxl=1,...,L ¯ pl. Consequently, it holds that ¯ p ∈ ˜ P.
Considersome ¯ p ∈ ˜ P.Ifz( ¯ p) = 0,thenitistriviallythecasethatf(λ, ¯ p) =¯ pforallλ ≥
λ( ¯ p).Supposez( ¯ p)  = 0.Weneedtoshowthatf(λ( ¯ p), ¯ p) =¯ p,whichimpliesthatthepro-
jectionof ¯ p+˜ v( ¯ p)onT L(¯ λ)equals ¯ p.ThisisachievedbysubstitutingintheKuhn–Tucker
conditions yl =¯ pl, xl =¯ pl +˜ vl( ¯ p), µ = 0, λ = λ( ¯ p), µk,l =˜ vk( ¯ p)˜ vl( ¯ p)/v if
˜ vk( ¯ p) > 0 and ˜ vl( ¯ p) < 0, and µk,l = 0, otherwise, where v =
 
{l|˜ vl( ¯ p)<0} ˜ vl( ¯ p). Observe
that all equalities and inequalities in the Kuhn–Tucker conditions are satisﬁed. 
When p∗ is a competitive equilibrium, then p∗ is a ﬁxed point of f for any value of λ
exceeding λ(p∗). When p is a price system generated by the adjustment process, but not a
competitive equilibrium, then p is a ﬁxed point of f(λ(p),·).
At p0 the value of λ(·) is zero. Along the path of the adjustment process, the value of λ(·)
increases initially, but it may decrease later on. Eventually, it will increase until it reaches
the value 1, and a competitive equilibrium has been found.
Theorem 6.3. The price adjustment process converges for any excess demand function
satisfying Assumption 2.
Proof. It is immediate that f satisﬁes the conditions of Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem
and so there is a component Fc of F ={ (λ,p) ∈ [0,1] × T L(1)|p = f(λ,p)} such
that ({0}×T L(1)) ∩ Fc  =∅and ({1}×T L(1)) ∩ Fc  =∅ . Let the projection function
g :[ 0 ,1] × T L(1) → T L(1) be deﬁned by g(λ,p) = p.B yTheorem 6.2 it follows
that g(F) = P. Since g is continuous,g(Fc) is a connected subset of P that connects the
starting price system p0 to some competitive equilibrium price system p∗. 
Once again, the convergence of a price adjustment process is intimately connected to
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7. The global Newton method of Smale
The following assumption on the excess demand function z is made throughout this
section.
Assumption3. Thefunctionz : RL
+\{0}→RL satisﬁescontinuity,homogeneity,Walras’
law and the following boundary behavior:
For every p ∈ RL
+\(RL
++∪{0}), z(p)−¯ z(p) is not radially outward pointing, i.e. there
is no µ>0 such that z(p)−¯ z(p) = µ(p −(1/L) ), where ¯ z(p) =
 L
l=1 zl(p)/L is the
mean excess demand at p, and is a vector of ones of appropriate dimension.
Assumption3isaweakversionoftheassumptioninSmale(1976),wheretwicecontinu-
ousdifferentiabilityofzisassumedandarathercomplicatedandstrongboundarycondition
is stated. An illustration of a radially outward pointing vector z(p)−¯ z(p) for various val-
ues of p can be found in Fig. 3. It holds that z(p)−¯ z(p) is radially outward pointing if it
lies on the ray starting at 0 and passing through p − (1/L) . We normalize prices, such as
to belong to the unit simplex SL.
The assumed boundary behavior is weaker than the requirement that zl(p) > 0 for some
l ∈ L for which pl = 0, a requirement that is natural for a function deﬁned on RL
+ \{ 0}.
Indeed, if l is such that pl = 0 and zl(p) > 0, then Walras’ law implies that there is
l  such that pl  > 0 and zl( p )>z l (p).S o ,z l(p) −¯ z ( p )>z l (p) −¯ z(p), whereas
−1/L = pl − 1/L <p l  − 1/L, which implies that z(p) −¯ z(p) is not radially outward
pointing.
There are several versions of Smale’s global Newton method. Here we combine the
approaches suggested in Smale (1976) on page 117, and Varian (1977)2 to apply Smale’s
method to the function ˜ z : DL → RL deﬁned by
˜ z(p) =˜ π(p)− p + (1 −  p − (1/L)  2)(z(˜ π(p))−¯ z(˜ π(p)) ),p ∈ DL,
where DL ={ p ∈ RL|
 L
l=1(pl − 1/L)2 ≤ 1and
 L
l=1 pl = 1}, a disk containing SL in
its interior, and ˜ π denotes the radial projection on SL.F o rp with
 L
l=1 pl = 1 not in SL,
the radial projection of p on SL is given by the price system where the line between p and
(1/L) hits the boundary of SL.I fp with
 L
l=1 pl = 1 does not belong to SL, then, for
l  ∈ argminl=1,...,Lpl,
˜ π(p)=
1/L
1/L − pl 
p +
−pl 
1/L − pl 
(1/L) .
If p ∈ SL, then ˜ π(p)= p.
The function ˜ z is simply an extension of the function z(·)−¯ z(·) multiplied by a positive
number to a disk containing the unit simplex in its interior. The vector ˜ z(p) is the sum of
the terms ˜ π(p)− p and z(˜ π(p))−¯ z(˜ π(p)) , where the latter term is multiplied by the
non-negative number (1− p−(1/L)  2). It is a positive multiple of z(p)−¯ z(p) on SL,
2 The construction of Varian (1977) applies to a more abstract problem on the unit disk, but our variation of his
construction to the set SL is rather straightforward.P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370 361
Fig. 3. A vector z(p) −¯ z( ¯ p) that is radially outward pointing for p = p1,p2,...,p9.
since ˜ π(p) = p for p ∈ SL. The contribution of the term z(˜ π(p))−¯ z(˜ π(p)) vanishes
on the relative boundary of DL, where it holds that  p − (1/L)  2 = 1. This makes the
function ˜ z radially inward pointing on the relative boundary of DL.
The zero points of z and ˜ z coincide. Indeed, there are no equilibria of ˜ z on the relative
boundary of DL as the term 1 −  p − (1/L)  2 vanishes there and the remaining term is362 P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370
˜ π(p)− p.O nSL, the function ˜ z is a positive multiple of z(·) −¯ z(·) . Obviously the zero
points of z(·)−¯ z(·) and z coincide. Consider a point p not on the relative boundary of DL
and outside SL. Then ˜ z(p) = 0 if and only if
˜ π(p)− p + (1 −  p − (1/L)  2)(z(˜ π(p))−¯ z(˜ π(p)) ) = 0.
Then it holds that
z(˜ π(p))−¯ z(˜ π(p)) =
1




1 −  p − (1/L)  2
(˜ π(p)− (1/L) ),
where l  ∈ argminl=1,...,Lpl. This implies that z is radially outward pointing at ˜ π(p),a
contradiction to Assumption 3.4.
Let ˆ z be the function ˜ z with the last component omitted. The differential equation of















Since the sum of the components of ˜ z(p) equals zero, it holds that  ∂˜ z(p) = 0. Then
∂ˆ z(p)(dp/dt)=− λ(p)ˆ z(p)implies ∂˜ zL(p)(dp/dt)=− λ(p)˜ zL(p), so the adjustment of
thepriceofcommodityLissimilartotheadjustmentofthepricesoftheothercommodities.
Since  (dp/dt)= 0, the sum of the prices is kept equal to one.
Thestartingpricesystemp0 hastobechosenintherelativeboundaryofDL toguarantee
convergencetoacompetitiveequilibriumpricesystem.InKeenan(1981)ithasbeenshown
that Smale’s process may not converge for starting price systems in the relative interior
of DL.
As Smale (1976) shows, his process generates price systems in the set
P ={ p ∈ DL|∃θ ≥ 0, ˜ z(p) = θ˜ z(p0)}.
It is easily veriﬁed, by taking θ = 1, that p0 ∈ P, and, by taking θ = 0, that p∗ ∈ P if
p∗ ∈ SL isanequilibriumpricesystem.Bytheargumentsgivenbeforetherearenosolutions
forθ = 0 withp∗ ∈ DL\SL.FromthedeﬁnitionofthesetP itfollowsthatthedifferential
equation adjusts prices in such a way that the excess demand remains proportional to the
excess demand at the starting price system.
Undersuitabledifferentiabilityassumptions,foragenericeconomy,Smale(1976)shows
thatthecomponentofP containingp0 isapaththatconnectsp0 toaWalrasianequilibriumP. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370 363
Fig. 4. The sets SL, T L(0), T L(1/3), T L(2/3) and T L(1), for p0 = (0.545,−0.455,0.91) .
price system. We show that even without such differentiability assumptions, and without
restricting attention to generic economies, the component of P containing p0 connects
p0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Smale’s global Newton method is said to be
convergent if this latter property holds.
For λ ≥ 0, we deﬁne the set
T L(λ) ={ p ∈ DL|p ·˜ z(p0) ≤ (1 − 2λ)p0 ·˜ z(p0)}.
In Fig. 4 the set T L(λ) is shown for various values of λ. The set T L(0) contains only the
point p0. The set T L(λ) expands when λ increases. The set T L(1) equals DL.F o rp ∈ DL,
we deﬁne λ(p) = (p − p0) ·˜ z(p0)/ − 2p0 ·˜ z(p0). It holds that p ∈ T L(λ) if and only if
λ ≥ λ(p).
We deﬁne the function f :[ 0 ,1] × T L(1) → T L(1) by
f(λ,p)= πT L(λ)(p +˜ z(p)).
Theorem 7.1. For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 3, for any p0 in
the relative boundary of DL, it holds that p ∈ P if and only if there is λ ∈ [0,1] such that
f(λ,p)= p. Moreover, either ˜ z(p)  = 0 and λ = λ(p) or ˜ z(p) = 0 and f(λ,p)= p for
all λ ≥ λ(p).
Proof. Consider a ﬁxed point ¯ p of f(¯ λ,·),s o ¯ p = f(¯ λ, ¯ p) = πT L(¯ λ)( ¯ p +˜ z( ¯ p)). We show
that ¯ p ∈ P.
Since f(0, ¯ p) = p0, it is obvious that f(0, ¯ p) =¯ p implies ¯ p = p0,s o ¯ p ∈ P.N e x t
consider the case ¯ λ>0. For ¯ p in the relative boundary of DL, ˜ z( ¯ p) is radially inward
pointing, so obviously πT L(¯ λ)( ¯ p +˜ z( ¯ p))  =¯ p. Consider ¯ p in the relative interior of DL.364 P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370
Then ¯ p = πT L(¯ λ)( ¯ p +˜ z( ¯ p)) if and only if the projection of ¯ p +˜ z( ¯ p) on ˜ T L(λ) ={ p ∈
RL|p ·˜ z(p0) ≤ (1 − 2¯ λ)p0 ·˜ z(p0)} equals ¯ p.








(yl − xl)2 s.t.( 1 − 2λ)p0 ·˜ z(p0) − y ·˜ z(p0) ≥ 0.
The necessary and sufﬁcient Kuhn–Tucker conditions for an optimum are given by
y − x + µ˜ z(p0) = 0,
µ((1 − 2λ)p0 ·˜ z(p0) − y ·˜ z(p0)) = 0,
(1 − 2λ)p0 ·˜ z(p0) − y ·˜ z(p0) ≥ 0,
µ ≥ 0,
where y equals the projection π ˜ T L(λ)(x) and µ denotes the shadow price of the constraint
(1 − 2λ)p0 ·˜ z(p0) − y ·˜ z(p0) ≥ 0.
Since ¯ p = πT L(¯ λ)( ¯ p +˜ z( ¯ p)), it follows that there exists µ ≥ 0 such that
¯ p −¯ p −˜ z( ¯ p)+ µ˜ z(p0) = 0,
so ˜ z( ¯ p) = µ˜ z(p0), and ¯ p ∈ P. This completes the ﬁrst part of the proof.
Considersome ¯ p ∈ P.If˜ z( ¯ p) = 0,thenitistriviallythecasethatf(λ, ¯ p) =¯ p whenever
¯ p ∈ T L(λ), i.e. when λ ≥ λ( ¯ p). Suppose ˜ z( ¯ p)  = 0. It is obvious that f(λ, ¯ p)  =¯ p when
λ  = λ( ¯ p). It remains to be shown that f(λ( ¯ p), ¯ p) =¯ p.I fλ( ¯ p) = 0, then ¯ p = p0 and
trivially f(0,p0) = p0. Suppose ˜ z( ¯ p)  = 0 and λ( ¯ p) > 0. There exists θ>0 such
that ˜ z( ¯ p) = θ˜ z(p0). From the necessary and sufﬁcient Kuhn–Tucker conditions it follows
that π ˜ T L(λ( ¯ p))( ¯ p +˜ z( ¯ p)) =¯ p. Since ¯ p ∈ T L(λ( ¯ p)) ⊂ ˜ T L(λ( ¯ p)), it holds as well that
πT L(λ( ¯ p))( ¯ p +˜ z( ¯ p)) =¯ p. 
Theorem 7.1 establishes that the ﬁxed points of f coincide with the prices in the set P.
When p∗ is a competitive equilibrium price system, then p∗ is a ﬁxed point of f for any
value of λ exceeding λ(p∗). When p is a price system generated by the adjustment process,
but does not correspond to a competitive equilibrium, then p is a ﬁxed point of f(λ(p),·),
where λ(p) < 1.
At p0 the value of λ(·) is zero. Along the path of the adjustment process, the value of λ(·)
increases initially, but it may decrease later on. Eventually, it will increase until it reaches
the value 1, and a competitive equilibrium has been found.
Theorem 7.2. The price adjustment process converges for any excess demand function
satisfying Assumption 3, for any p0 in the relative boundary of DL.
Proof. It is immediate that f satisﬁes the conditions of Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem
and so there is a component Fc of F ={ (λ,p) ∈ [0,1] × T L(1)|p = f(λ,p)} suchP. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370 365
that ({0}×T L(1)) ∩ Fc  =∅and ({1}×T L(1)) ∩ Fc  =∅ . Let the projection function
g :[ 0 ,1] × T L(1) → T L(1) be deﬁned by g(λ,p) = p. By Theorem 5.2 it follows
that g(F) = P. Since g is continuous,g(Fc) is a connected subset of P that connects the
starting price system p0 to some competitive equilibrium price system p∗. 
The proof of Theorem 7.2 show that convergence of the price adjustment process is a
corollary to Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem.
8. From orbits to differential equations
In the previous ﬁve sections, the orbit of a number of adjustment processes is speciﬁed
as being the set of ﬁxed points of a continuous function f :[ 0 ,1] × S → S.I nt h e
strategy adjustment processes of Sections 3 and 4, the speciﬁcation of f is straightforward.
In the price adjustment processes in Sections 5–7, f(λ,p) = πT L(λ)(p +˜ z(p)), with ˜ z
corresponding to some normalization of the excess demand function and T L(λ) a set that
expandsinλandbeingsuchthatT L(1) = S.Bychoosingdifferentnormalizationsfor ˜ zand
different expanding sets T L(λ), it is possible to generate new price adjustment processes,
as is illustrated at the end of this section.
It has been argued in Section 2 that, under suitable differentiability and transversality
conditions, the orbits generated by the adjustment processes are well-behaved sets. If so,
the reverse of the question treated so far in the exposition arises, i.e. whether it is possible
to ﬁnd a system of differential equations that generates a given orbit.
Consider ﬁrst the case where the differentiable orbit (λ(t),s(t)) corresponding to the
ﬁxed points of f can be parameterized by arc length t. Notice that λ(0) = 0 and that s(0)
is the starting point of the adjustment process.
Let the function g be deﬁned by g(λ,s) = f(λ,s)− s. Suppose that zero is a regular
value of both g and of the restriction of g to {0,1}×S. Let J(λ,s)denote the Jacobian of
g evaluated at (λ,s). The matrix J(λ,s)is L × (L + 1), with L the dimension of S, and
has rank L because of the regularity assumptions made with respect to g.
These regularity assumptions also imply that there is a unique vector T(J(0,s(0))) in
the kernel of J(0,s(0)) satisfying  T(J(0,s(0))) 2 = 1 and with the ﬁrst component of
T(J(0,s(0))) positive. Let T(J(λ,s))denote the unique vector in the kernel of J(λ,s)












It can be shown that the orbit of zero points induced by g is generated by the autonomous
system of differential equations
(˙ λ, ˙ s) = T(J(λ,s)),
where (˙ λ, ˙ s) denotes differentiation with respect to arc length, see for instance Allgower
and Georg (1983). The system of autonomous differential equations was ﬁrst proposed by
Davidenko (1953), and is also referred to as the Davidenko equations.366 P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370
Using the Davidenko equations immediately leads to Smale’s process. Indeed, the orbit
of Smale’s process is characterized by the system of equations











The Davidenko equations specify that
(˙ λ, ˙ p) = T(J(λ,p)),











Since ˜ z(p) = (1 − λ)˜ z(p0), the speciﬁcation of Smale’s process as in Section 7 follows.
By varying the set T L(λ) it is possible to obtain new adjustment processes. Consider for
instance the case where the endogenous variable p belongs to a cube [0,1]L and the excess
demand function ˜ z :[ 0 ,1]L → RL satisﬁes the boundary condition ˜ zl(p) ≥ 0i fpl = 0
and ˜ zl(p) ≤ 0i fpl = 1.
The cube [0,1]L could represent prices belonging to the set of extended real vectors
of dimension L, and ˜ z the excess demands of the ﬁrst L commodities out of L + 1. The
price of commodity L + 1 is normalized to be equal to some constant. By Walras’ law it
follows that the market for commodity L + 1 clears when the excess demands for the ﬁrst
L commodities are zero.
Consider the case where T L(λ) is an expanding cube,
T L(λ) ={ p ∈ CL|(1 − λ)p0
l ≤ pl ≤ p0
l + λ(1 − p0
l ), l = 1,...,L}.















The function f :[ 0 ,1] × T L(1) → T L(1) is deﬁned by
f(λ,p)= πT L(λ)(p +˜ z(p)).P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370 367
To analyze the properties of f, consider ﬁrst the projection of a vector x ∈ RL on T L(λ).







(yl − xl)2 s.t.p 0
l − λp0
l ≤ yl ≤ p0
l + λ(1 − p0
l ), l = 1,...,L.
The necessary and sufﬁcient Kuhn–Tucker conditions, with µ−
l and µ+
l the Lagrange mul-
tipliers corresponding to the two inequality constraints related to commodity l, lead to:




l (yl − p0
l + λp0
l ) = 0,
µ+
l (−yl + p0
l + λ(1 − p0





l + λ(1 − p0





It is easily veriﬁed that xl >p 0
l + λ(1 − p0
l ) implies µ+
l > 0, so yl = p0
l + λ(1 − p0
l ).
Also,x l <p 0
l − λp0
l implies µ−
l > 0, so yl = p0
l − λp0
l . Otherwise,y l = xl and p0
l +
λ(1 − p0
l ) ≥ xl ≥ p0
l − λp0
l .
Fixed points of f have nice properties. Consider (¯ λ, ¯ p)such that ¯ p = πT L(¯ λ)( ¯ p+˜ z( ¯ p)).
If ¯ pl +˜ z( ¯ p )>p 0
l + ¯ λ(1−p0
l ), then ¯ pl = p0
l + ¯ λ(1−p0
l ).I f ¯ pl +˜ z( ¯ p) <p 0
l − ¯ λp0
l , then
¯ pl = p0
l − ¯ λp0
l . Otherwise it holds that ¯ pl =¯ pl +˜ zl( ¯ p),s o˜ zl( ¯ p) = 0. It follows that the
adjustment process generates price systems in the set
P ={ p ∈ [0,1]L|∃¯ λ ∈ [0,1], forl = 1,...,L,
˜ zl(p) > 0 ⇒¯ pl = p0
l + ¯ λ(1 − p0
l ), forl = 1,...,L,
˜ zl(p) < 0 ⇒¯ pl = p0
l − ¯ λp0
l , forl = 1,...,L,
˜ zl(p) = 0 ⇒ p0
l − ¯ λp0
l ≤¯ pl ≤ p0
l + ¯ λ(1 − p0
l )}.
It can be shown as before that the price adjustment process is convergent. Notice that the
price adjustment process has a very nice intuitive interpretation. Prices of commodities l
in excess demand are increased at a rate (1 − p0
l ) with respect to the initial price p0
l and
prices of commodities l in excess supply are decreased at a rate p0
l with respect to the
initial price. Prices of commodities whose markets are in equilibrium are adjusted such that
markets remain in equilibrium, as long as it is possible to do so for prices pl satisfying
p0
l − ¯ λp0
l ≤¯ pl ≤ p0
l + ¯ λ(1 − p0
l ).
Is it possible to formulate a system of differential equations that generates the orbit of
the adjustment process above. Compared to the situation in the beginning of the section,
an additional difﬁculty is that orbits can only be expected to be piecewise differentiable.368 P. Jean-Jacques Herings/Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 341–370
This problem can be solved by applying a so-called α-transformation as proposed in Garcia
and Zangwill (1981). If we make the following substitutions into the system of ﬁrst-order
conditions that characterizes the ﬁxed points of f,
µ−
l = [max{0,α l}]2,
pl − p0
l + λp0
l = [min{0,α l}]2,
µ+
l = [max{0,β l}]2,
−pl + p0
l + λ(1 − p0
l ) = [min{0,β l}]2,
and rearrange terms, we ﬁnd that the ﬁxed points of f are characterized by the solutions to
˜ zl([min{0,α}]2 + p0 − λp0) + [max{0,α l}]2 − [max{0,β l}]2 = 0,
[min{0,α l}]2 + [min{0,β l}]2 = λ.




We have studied the convergence of a number of distinct adjustment processes in game
theory and in general equilibrium theory. Convergence of the processes has been shown
before in the literature by rather ad hoc arguments, and only for generic games and generic
economies, under suitable differentiability assumptions. We have argued that the driving
force behind convergence is to be found in Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem, which applies
underverygeneralconditionsanddoesnotinvolveanyassumptionsondifferentiability.Itis
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